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ADVERSE POSSESSION
By ADOLPH KANNEBERG*
T HERE is a familiar saying which has attained almost to the
dignity of a proverb, to the effect that "possession is nine points
of the law." No attempt has been made to determine the origin of this
expression, but there is at least a strong possibility that it was coined
at some stage of a dispute between a person claiming a record title
to property and another claiming a title based on occupancy of the
property. The expression itself would seem to indicate that there was
some feeling that actual occupancy of property conferred certain pro-
prietary rights which might prove a sounder basis for a title claim
than a mere record of title without possession of the property.
Under the old English common law, transfer of title to real prop-
erty, or real estate as it is commonly known, was accomplished by a
process known as "livery of seizin." The grantor of the title would
act a fictitious delivery of the land itself by handing or delivering
to the grantee a stick of wood, a handful of ground, a branch of a
tree, or a stone taken from the land which was the subject of the con-
veyance. After such physical delivery the grantee was said to be
"seized" of the title, or, otherwise stated, it was said that "seizin"
was in the grantee. Later the fiction of a physical delivery of the
property itself was abandoned and title was conveyed by a formal
written instrument wherein the property was particularly described
and the grantor named the grantee and the terms upon and subject
* Chairman, Railroad Commission of Wisconsin.
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to which the title was conveyed. This form of conveyance was called
a "deed". Thereafter Parliament adopted a law called the "Statute
of Frauds" which provided, in effect, that any conveyance of title to
real estate must be by writing executed by the grantor. Similar
statutes have been adopted in Wisconsin and other states in this coun-
try. In addition the statutes of this state, and of some others, set
forth certain requirements with respect to form, execution, and ac-
knowledgement which must be complied with to entitle a deed to
record in the office of the register of deeds of the county wherein the
land is situated. Such recording is necessary to charge innocent third
parties with notice of the record title which the grantee acquires by
such conveyance.'
Thus, our law has developed to a point where an owner of real
property can convey his title voluntarily only through the means of a
written instrument of a special form properly executed. But, though
he may not himself convey title by other means, he may be deprived
of his title without the formalities mentioned. Thus, he may have
his property, real or personal, taken from him and sold to satisfy a
judgment against him. In case of his death, title to his property will
pass to his heirs by operation of the law of descent. Or he may be
deprived of his real estate by what is known in the law as "adverse
possession". The terms "user" or "prescription" are often used inter-
changeably with adverse possession. The efforts of the courts to de-
termine when title to property has been lost to the owner of record
and acquired by an adverse possesor has resulted in the growth of a
great body of law which is commonly referred to as the law of ad-
verse possession.
One who has a perfect record title to real property is presumed to
be in possession thereof. Such presumption of possession is co-exten-
sive with the right and continues until the owner is ousted by the ad-
verse possession of another.
ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO PRIVATE LANDS BY PRIVATE PERSONS.
Adverse possession then, as the term itself implies, is necessarily a
possession not held under the legal proprietor, or by his consent, either
directly or indirectly, but on the contrary it is a possession by which
he is ousted from the land.2 A possession which is rightful and not
an invasion of the rights of another is never adverse. The statutes
of the state where the property is situated provide the period of time
requisites concerning the character of the possesion. The effect of
I Ch. 235, Wisconsin Statutes, 1929.
2Ryan vs. Schwartz, 94 Wis., 403; 69 N. W., 178.
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such statutes is uniformly that the adverse possession must exist
under a claim of right or under color of title for the whole period
prescribed, and must be actual, continuous, open, visible, notorious,
and hostile to the true owner's title and to the world at large.
Good faith on the part of the person making entry upon the land
is not essential to render such entry and the possession held under it
adverse. It is a sufficient "claim of title" that the entry of the des-
seisor is hostile to the world and that he intends to so hold it for the
statutory period of limitation. When all the statutory requirements
have been met, the result is two-fold: First, the title of the record
holder is cut off and his right to bring an action for recovery of the
property is cut off. This result is founded in a sound public policy
which does not aim to punish one who fails to assert his rights, but
rather to protect one who has maintained the possession of the land
for the time specified by the statute, under claim of right or color of
title, and adverse possession for the statutory period raises a presump-
tion of valid title.
Throughout this discussion it will be necessary to refer to the
terms, "color of title" and "claim of right", and to have an under-
standing of what each includes. A possession under "color of title" is
a possession flowing from rights conferred by some written instrument
or judgment, which by itself is insufficient to pass title, due to some
inherent infirmity. Thus, a deed from a grantor who has an imperfect
title, or a deed which is not properly witnessed and acknowledged, a
tax deed defective because of jurisdictional errors, or a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction in the court, all would constitute "color
of title".
A "claim of right" consists of assertion of ownership of property
adverse to the title of the holder of the record title. Such assertion
need not include a formal declaration of ownership, but the perform-
ance of acts indicating ownership and excluding the legal owner are
sufficient.3
The distinction between possession under color of title and under
claim of right is important because the length of time required under
each for the adverse possession to ripen into legal title is different.
Thus, in Wisconsin the requirement necessary to bar the holder of
the legal title is ten years adverse possession under color of title, and
twenty years adverse possession under claim of right. There is a
further distinction as to what constitutes possession in each case.
aIllinois Steel Co. vs. Budsisz, 106 Wis., 499; 81 N.W., 1027; Allis vs. Field,
89 Wis., 327; 62 N.W., 85; Furlong vs. Garrett, 44 Wis., 111; Meade vs.
Gilfoyle, 64 Wis., 18; Ovig vs. Morrison, 142 Wis., 243; Bourne vs. Viele,
159 Wis., 340; La Crosse vs. Cameron, 80 Fed., 264.
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Thus, the legislature has provided in Section 330.07 of the statutes
that where a claim is based on color of title the land shall be deemed
to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved;
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;
3. Where, although not enclosed, it has been used for the supply
of fuel, or of fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry, or
for the ordinary use of the occupant;
4. Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved,
the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not
cleared or not enclosed according to the usual course and cus-
tom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been
occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or
cultivated.
In this statute the state has quite definitely expressed what will
constitute possession or occupancy for ten years where the claim of
ownership is based on color of title. The statute with respect to title
which is based on claim of right, or as to otherwise expressed asser-
tion of ownership, is quite as definite but is more restricted. Thus, it
is provided in section 330.09 that in such case land shall be deemed
to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
1. When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;
2. When it has been usually cultivated or improved.
It is further provided that only the premises actually occupied shall be
deemed to have been held adversely. So, contrary to the rule where
claim is based on "color of title", if only part of a known farm is
actually occupied, only that part will be deemed the subject of ad-
verse possession.
While the statutes referred to in a measure define what is occu-
pancy, their language is too general to be reliable as the sole guide in
determining whether their requirements are met. Thus, what might
be usual cultivation in one case may prove insufficient in another; what
is actually an improvement of one parcel of land may not be with
respect to another. As a result, it becomes necessary in every case
that examination be made of the character of the land, the custom of
the vicinity with respect to cultivation or improvement, and all other
circumstances surrounding the holding.'
4Wilson vs. Henry, 40 Wis., 594; Stephenson vs. Wilson, 37 Wis., 482; 50
Wis., 95; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. vs. Telilah Paper Co., 140 Wis., 417; 122
N.W., 1062; Illinois Steel Co. vs. Bilot, 109 Wis., 418; 84 N.W., 855; Clithers
vs. Fennzer, 122 Wis., 356; 99 N.W., 1027; Illinois Steel Co. vs. Jeka, 123 Wis.,
419; 101 N.., 99; Dupont vs. Davis, 35 Wis., 631; Pepper vs. O'Dowd, 39
Wis., 538.
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The foregoing statutory quotations and remarks following have
dealt chiefly with the question of what is actual possession. As stated
before, the fact of actual possession is not enough; the requirements
as to actual possession set forth in the statutes might all be performed
by a tenant or a licensee, and such performance would not ripen into
a title by adverse possession. In addition to being actual, the occu-
pancy must be open, notorious, hostile, and continuous. It may be
,vell to consider what is required to meet the demands of these terms.
While it is certain that possession must be open and notorious,
these adjectives do not entirely express the thought to be conveyed.
A more correct statement of the rules is as follows: In order to make
good a claim of adverse holding, either the true owner must have
actual knowledge of the hostile claim, or the possession must be so
open, visible, and notorious as to raise the presumption of notice to
the world that the true owner is invaded intentionally and with a pur-
pose to assert a claim of title adversely to his, or so patent that the
owner could not be deceived, and such that if he remains in ignorance
it is his own fault. As one court has said, "The claimant must exercise
such acts of ownership as are sufficient to hoist his flag over the lands
so that all may observe it". A clandestine entry or possession will not
set the statute in motion, but if the claimant's possession is open and
notorious, it is sufficient whether the true owner actually knows the
facts or not. In such a case the law presumes notice to the true owner
in the absence of evidence that inquiries by the true owner, prosecuted
with due diligence, did not disclose such possession.5 Under local
statutes in some states, it is necessary to give the true owner actual
notice of adverse claim. This is true in Alabama, Kentucky, and
Michigan, but such statutes are in derogation of the common law and
are contrary to the general rule. Where such statutes apply, it is not
necessary for the possession to be open and notorious, as these char-
acteristics are deemed essential to give notice, and necessity for them
is removed by the requirement that actual notice be given.
The holding must be "exclusive". By this it is meant simply that
the intruder must show an exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use. It is essential that his possession
shall amount to an ouster of the true owner, because in the absence
of ouster the legal title draws to itself the constructive possession of
the property.6
Also, the possession must be hostile. Ordinarily the word "hostile"
5 Kurz vs. Miller, 89 Wis., 426; 62 N.W., 182; Stevens vs. Brooks, 24 \Vis.,
326;Lampnzan vs. Van Alstine, 94 Wis., 417; 69 N.W., 171; Perkins vs.
Perkins, 173 Wis., 421; 180 N.W., 334.
6 McConrt vs. Eckstein, 22 Wis., 153.
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is defined as "showing ill will and malevolence, or a desire to thwart
and injured". That definition does not correctly state the necessary
character of the occupancy, for there need be no ill will, malevolence,
or desire to injure anyone. The term "independent" would more clear-
]y describe the required character of the holding. Hostile is used to
convey the thought that the holding must be of a nature which will
exclude the claims of the world and in addition will constitute a denial
of the owner's legal title.7
The foregoing consideration has led to some repetition, due to the
fact that the meaning given to the different terms has been such as to
render them almost synonymous in some cases. Nevertheless, it has
been thought best to consider each of them briefly, as courts custo-
marily use all of them to describe the requisites of an adverse posses-
sion. In addition to the characteristics already considered, the holding
must be continuous and uninterrupted for the full statutory period.
The moment the possession is broken it ceases to be effectual, because
as soon and as often as a break occurs, the law restores the construc-
tive possession of the owner. In this connection it must be borne in
mind that possession is not to be confused with residence., It is true
in considering continuity, as in considering other characteristics, that
where it is apparent to men of ordinary prudence that the claimant
is asserting and exercising ownership over the property, his possession
is sufficient. 9
While the adverse possession must be continuously maintained for
the entire required period, it is not necessary that it be maintained by
the same person. Continuity may be just as effectively shown by the
successive possession of several persons, between whom the requisite
legal relationship, or as it is termed, privity, exists.1 0 This joining of
successive possessions, is called "tacking." All that is necessary to
privity between successive occupants of property and in regard thereto,
is that one receive his possession from the other directly or by an
operation of law, as by descent, will, grant, or other transfer of pos-
session." Thus, sufficient privity.exists between an ancestor and his
heirs and the grantees of such heirs. It has been held that privity
existed between husband and wife, vendor and vendee, and grantor
'Ryan vs. Schwart;, 94 Wis., 403; 69 N.W., 178.
8 lW'hittlesey vs. Hoppenyan, 72 \Vis., 140; 39 N.W., 355 Hemwmy vs. D1n, 125
Wis., 275; 103 N.W., 1095.
9 Illinois Steel Co. vs. Jeka, 123 Wis., 419; 101 N.W., 399.
10Illinois Steel Co. vs. Paczocha, 139 Wis., 23; 119 N.W., 550; Progress Blue
Ribbon Farms vs. Harter, 147 Wis., 133; 132 N.W., 895.
1"Mortenson vs. Murphy, 153 Wis., 389; 141 N.W. 273; Illinois Steel Co. vs.
Bndsisz, 106 Wis., 499; 81 N.W., 1027.
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and grantee, providing always that there has been no intervening break
between the successive possessions. The continuity of the original
adverse possession may be effected by a conveyance or understanding,
the purpose of which is to transfer to another the rights and the pos-
session of the adverse claimant, when accompanied by an actual de-
livery of the possession. Such transfer need not be by an instrument
in writing, for the law's requirement of continuous adverse possession
for the full statutory period may be accomplished as well by an oral
agreement or understanding, under which the actual possession of the
premises is delivered, as by a written conveyance.' But where privity
does not exist, there can be no "tacking" of possession, and several suc-
cessive possessions lacking privity will not ripen into title." Entries
of this character, when not continuous for the required period of time,
are merely a series of independent trespasses and will not deprive the
true owner of title, for the law restores possession to him on discon-
tinuance of the possession of each of such trespassers.
• Any substantial interruption of the possession of an adverse claim-
ant will destroy its continuity. If, after the adverse holding has begun,
a claimant recognizes another as the owner, or recognizes another title
as superior to his own, such recognition will constitute a sufficient
interruption to take him out of the statute. 4 Payment of rent for the
use of the property would defeat a claim against the one to whom rent
was paid. However, the fact that an adverse claimant acknowledges
a superior right in one person does not preclude him from holding
adversely as to all others. An abandonment by the adverse possessor
with intention to relinquish his claim, would restore possession to the
legal owner. The same result would follow from a legal entry upon
the land during the limitation and such entry may be made by the legal
owner, his tenant, agent, or his heirs following his death, and such
entry must be open and accompanied by assertion of claim to the land
or by some act evidencing ownership. In spite of such entry, if the
adverse occupant remains in possession thereafter, the statute will begin
to run anew and such possession will have the effect of a new disseisin.
An action at law or in equity by the lawful owner to recover pos-
session has the same effect as the physical entry and will stay the run-
ning of the statute as of the date when the action is commenced, even
though the adverse claimant remains in possession during the pend-
ency of the action.5 But the continuity of the possession is not inter-
rupted by the adverse claimant's act in purchasing or bargaining for
12 Allis vs. Field, 89 Wis., 27; 632 N.W., 85.
13 Childs vs. Nelson, 69 Wis., 125.
14 Illinois Steel Co. vs. Budsisz, 115 Wis., 68; 90 N.W., 1019.
15 Illinois Steel Co. vs. Kohnke, 151 Wis. 410; 138 N.V., 995.
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an outstanding title. An act of this character admits, and admits only,
that the occupant deems it worth while to get rid of or acquire the
outstanding title, and united to the one under which he has been hold-
ing, it does not prove, and standing alone it does not even tend to
prove, a change in the character of the possession or the recognition
of a title paramount. 16
Up to this point this discussion has dealt entirely with the matter
of acquisition of title to private property by a private person. It is to
be noted that the public also may procure an interest in privately
owned real estate, and a private person may acquire title to publicly
owned property.
AcQuISITION OF A PUBLIC HIGHWAY BY PRESCRIPTION. The most
common example of the acquisition of private property by the public is
found with respect to highways. As a preliminary to the above con-
sideration, the methods of transfer of record title to property were
discussed. As a preliminary here, it may be mentioned that the statutes
carefully provide a method whereby land may be condemned for high-
way purposes or may be dedicated to the use of the public for high-
ways, and further specifies the manner in which such proceedings shall
be made matters of public record. When the statutes have been fully
complied with, the public has acquired highway rights as unimpeach-
able as a perfect record title to real estate. But the state has gone
further and recognizes that such rights may flow to the public by
adverse possession and makes a distinction with respect thereto which
is comparable to the distinction between claim of title under "color of
title" and under "claim of right" in the statutes referred to above.
Subsection (1) of section 80.01 of the statutes provides in sub-
stance, that where highways have been laid out by the competent
authorities and a certificate of such proceedings has been properly
recorded and any portion of such highway has been opened and
worked for a term of three years, such highway shall be deemed to
be a legal highway even though the law shall not have been fully
complied with in laying it out. It is further declared that making an
order for laying out the highway and filing the order, or certified copy
thereof, in the office of the clerk of the town in which such road is
situated, is a sufficient recording. Thus, by analogy, the proceedings
for laying out the highway, although imperfect in themselves, consti-
tute a color of title which ripens into a valid highway right, by adverse
possession, upon recording and three years' user.
Subsection (2) of the same statute provides, with certain excep-
16 Clithers vs. Fenner, 122 Wis., 356; 99 N.W., 1027.
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tions, that all roads not recorded which shall have been used and
worked as public highways for ten years or more shall be deemed
public highways. Here the right accrues by the adverse user for the
period stated and is analogous to a title gained by adverse possession
under a claim of right. The section excepts from its provisions roads
and bridges built upon the bottoms and sloughs of the Mississippi
River in this state by citizens or municipalities of other states, provid-
ing they shall not become legal highways unless they are legally laid
out by the supervisors of the town in which they are situated. Nor
shall any grant of lands for highway purposes which had not become
a legal highway prior to July 1, 1913, become effective until accepted
by the town and a resolution of such acceptance has been filed and
recorded in the office of the town clerk. It has been held in Nuthals
vs. Green Bay, 162 Wis., 434, that this section does not abrogate the
common law rule of this state that a highway may be created by ad-
verse user alone for a period of twenty years.
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT TO FLOW LANDS BY MILL OR FLOODING DAIN1S.
Under section 330.18, subsection (3), statutes, an absolute right to
flow lands will exist after such lands have been flooded uninterrupted-
ly, continuously, openly, notoriously, and adversely for a period of ten
years "by reason of the construction or maintenance of any mill dam".
Subsection (5) of the foregoing section provides:
An action for the recovery of damages for flowing lands when such
lands shall have been flowed by reason of the construction or mainte-
nance of any flooding dam or other dams constructed, used or main-
tained for the purpose of facilitating the driving or handling of saw
logs on the Chippewa, Menomonee, or Eau Claire rivers or any tribu-
tary of either of them, provided that in cases where the ten years have
already expired, the parties shall have six months from and after the
passage and publication hereof within which an action may be brought.
The words "any mill dam" in subsection (3), above do not relate
merely to dams across non-navigable streams authorized by the so-
called Mill Dam Act, section 31.31-31-33, statutes, but include a dam
built across a navigable stream for the purpose of creating power to
operate mills.1 7 Independently of the statute a prescriptive right will
arise as against the owners of such lands after twenty years of adverse
flooding.
When a dam has been constructed without legislative permission,
it constitutes a public nuisance and may be abated at the suit of the
state or any citizen thereof by express provision of the water power
law, Chapter 31, statutes.
17 Green Bay & M. C. Co. vs. Teiudah Co., 140 Wis., 417.
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No right to maintain a public nuisance can arise by prescription
and therefore a dam which is unlawful to begin with can never become
lawful by mere lapse of time.
A dam built to a greater height than authorized by the permit or
legislative charter is an unlawful structure as to such excessive height
as against the state or the public, but the fact that a dam is an unlaw-
ful structure does not prevent the acquirement by prescription of the
right to maintain such a dam as against individual owners of land
above the dam.
The mill dam act authorizes the owner of a damsite on an naviga-
ble stream to erect a dam and to flood the lands of upper riparian
owners. The only remedy of such upper riparians is to bring an action
for damages in a court of law as provided in section 31.33, statutes
(mill dam) act. This section provides that no damages suffered more
than three years before the commencement of an action shall be re-
covered for the flooding of lands by a mill dam. In other words, the
person whose lands have been flooded may bring his action at any time
within ten years after the commencement of such flooding, but he is
limited to recover damages for three years previous to the commence-
ment of the action.
DAM UNDER THE CRANBERRY LAW, SECTIONS 9F.JE-T'F-VV, STAT-
CTES An owner of lands adapted to the growth of cranberries may
construct drains or ditches on the land of another and may flood the
land of another by reason of a dam erected for the growth of cran-
berries and thereby become liable to such other for all damages in-
curred.
The damages under the statute are assessed by arbitrators. The
statute does not limit the time in which the proceedings for damages
may be brought and hence Section 330.02, statutes, being a restatement
of the common law rule applies. Section 330.02 reads as follows:
No action for the recovery of real property or the possession
thereof shall be maintained unless it appear that the plaintiff, his an-
cestor, predecessor, or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises
in question within twenty years before the commencement of such
action.
PRESCRIPTIvE RIGHTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN. It will' be well to consider very briefly some
exceptions to the general rules discussed herein. In the absence of
legislation providing otherwise, the statute of limitation does not run
against the government. Therefore, title to public lands cannot be
acquired by adverse possession as against the United States; as a gen-
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eral rule the same is true as to the several states. However, the rule
has been changed by statute in some states, including Wisconsin. Sec-
tion 330.28 provides that title to real property belonging to the state
may be acquired by adverse possession if such possession has con-
tinued uninterruptedly for more than forty years. The requirements
with respect to the character of the possession are the same against
the state as against a private party, but the limitation period is in-
creased from twenty years to forty years. This statute may cover a
case, which serves as an illustration of the statement above, that a
private party may acquire public property by adverse possession.
ADVERSE POSSESSION BY TENANT. A tenant's right to acquire title
by adverse possession as against a landlord is restricted by section
330.11. It is provided that whenever the relation of landlord and
tenant shall have existed between any persons, the possession of the
tenant shall be deemed the possession of the landlord until the expira-
tion of ten years from the termination of the tenancy, and if there is
no written lease, until the expiration of ten years from the time of the
last payment of rent. From the language of this section, such pre-
sumption seems to be conclusive, and it appears that the tenant is
precluded from showing that his holding within such ten-year period
was in fact adverse.
TELEGRAPi, TELEPHONE AND ELECTRIC WIRES. The maintenance
of telegraph, telephone, or electric wires or cables will not be consid-
ered adverse and no prescriptive rights will result from such main-
tenance under the provisions of section 330.12.
PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. The legislature has recognized that
certain persons are legally incompetent to protect their rights against
an adverse possession, and section 330.14 was enacted for their pro-
tection. The statute recognizes as incompetent a person who, at the
time his title accrued or descended to him, was either
(a) Under 21 years of age;
(b) Insane;
(c) Imprisoned on a criminal charge for a term less
than life.
As against said persons possession for a period of time fixed in
the adverse possession statutes will not divest title, and an action for
recovery of the land may be brought after the time limited and within
five years after the disability shall cease or after the death of the per-
son entitled, who shall die under such disability.
The discussion has attempted to present a brief outline of the law
of -adverse possession and it should be considered as an outline rather
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than an exhaustive treatment of the subject. The purpose has not been
to state the law applicable to particular situations, but rather to em-
phasize the importance of the subject. An attorney who renders a title
opinion usually excepts from his opinion, and does not attempt to pass
on the rights of the parties in possession of the premises considered.
This is done because counsel recognizes that such parties may have
rights which may seriously impair an apparently clear record title, and
further, that the extent of such adverse rights can only be determined
by investigation of the facts of each case. The same caution should
be observed by any person in any way concerned in the determination
of the ownership of real estate, and this consideration has aimed to
briefly sketch various factors to be considered in exercising caution
and in reaching a determination.
